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Abstract
Platforms use search diversion in order to trade off total consumer traffic for higher
revenues derived by exposing consumers to unsolicited products (e.g. advertising). We
show that the entry of a platform competitor leads to higher (lower) equilibrium levels of
search diversion relative to a monopoly platform when the degree of horizontal differentia-
tion between platforms is intermediate (low). On the other hand, more intense competition
between active platforms (i.e. less differentiation) leads to less search diversion.
When platforms charge consumers fixed access fees, all equilibrium levels of search
diversion under platform competition are equal to the monopoly level, irrespective of
the nature of competition. Furthermore, platforms that charge positive (negative) access
fees to consumers have weaker (stronger) incentives to divert search relative to platforms
that cannot charge such fees. Finally, endogenous affiliation on both sides (consumers
and advertising) leads to stronger incentives to divert search relative to the one-sided
exogenous affiliation (vertical integration) benchmark, whenever the marginal advertiser
derives higher profits per consumer exposure relative to the average advertiser.
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1 Introduction
Search diversion occurs when platforms providing access to various products deliberately intro-
duce noise in the search or browsing process through which consumers find the products they
are most interested in. This practice is widespread among both offline and online platforms. All
advertising-supported media (from magazines to online portals, news sites, and search engines)
are purposefully designed to expose users to advertisements, even though they are primarily
interested in content. Similarly, retailers often place the most sought-after items at the back or
upper floors of their stores (e.g. bread and milk at supermarkets, iPods and iPhones at Apple
stores), while shopping malls design their layout to maximize the distance travelled by visitors
between anchor stores (Petroski 2003). E-commerce sites (e.g. Amazon, Bing Shopping, eBay,
Google Shopping) design their websites in order to divert users’ attention from the products
they were initially looking for, towards discovering products they might be interested in and
eventually buy (unsollicited products or advertising).
On the one hand, search diversion may lead to higher platform revenues per consumer "visit"
to the platform. On the other hand, it reduces the overall attractiveness of the platform to
consumers and therefore also leads to lower consumer traffic (i.e. total mumber of visits). All
platforms listed above face this fundamental tradeoff.
The basic economic logic of search diversion was first analyzed by Hagiu and Jullien (2011),
using a model with a monopoly platform (intermediary) that offers consumers access to two
products, whose affiliation with (i.e. availability through) the platform is exogenously given.
Here we extend that analysis in two important directions: platform competition with horizontal
differentiation and endogenous affiliation on both sides of the market - consumers and an
unsollicited product supplier (advertiser).
Our key results are as follows. First, platform competition does not necessarily reduce search
diversion incentives relative to monopoly. Specifically, when consumers affiliate exclusively with
one platform, competing platforms induce less (more) search diversion than a monopolist if the
degree of differentiation between platforms is low (intermediate). When differentiation is large,
competing platforms behave like local monopolies and therefore choose the monopoly level
of search diversion. One interpretation of the scenario in which competing platforms divert
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search more than a monopoly is that, since consumers are more difficult to attract under
competition, platforms may prefer to increase revenue per consumer by diverting more search.
This result holds whether the advertiser affiliates exclusively or multihomes. Moreover, with
exclusive advertising affiliation, each platform takes into account its competitor’s incentives
to compete for the advertiser. As a result, when competition is effective on both sides, the
equilibrium level of search diversion maximizes total industry profit (both platforms and the
advertiser). On the other hand, one platform may prefer not to compete for the advertiser if
it derives sufficient consumer demand and revenue from the content solicited by consumers. In
this case, the equilibrium level of search diversion does not account for the "losing" platform’s
profits.
Second, if platforms can charge consumers access fees, competing platforms choose the
same level of search diversion as a monopoly platform for all parameter values and regardless
of the mode of platform competition: all platforms maximize the total surplus per consumer.
Furthermore, the ability to charge fixed access fees results in less search diversion if and only if
the actual fee charged is positive. Third, endogenous affiliation of the advertiser and incomplete
information regarding the advertiser’s payoff create a novel source of incentives for platforms
to divert search (relative to Hagiu and Jullien 2011). This incentive stems from a distortion
reminiscent of Spence (1975)’s distinction between the marginal and the average customer (here,
advertiser). As a result, vertical integration of a platform monopolist into advertising leads to
more (less) search diversion if and only if the payoff of the average advertiser is greater than
the payoff of the marginal advertiser under no integration (endogenous affiliation).
1.1 Model overview and interpretation
In our model, each platform offers consumers access to two products, 1 and 2. Product 1
(content) offers consumers expected utility 1  0 and is assumed to be exogenously affiliated
with each platform throughout the paper. Product 2 corresponds to unsolicited content, which
for convenience we refer to as advertising. It offers consumers expected utility 2 = 0 and is
supplied by a third-party seller (advertiser), who must be induced to affiliate by platforms’
choices of fees and search diversion. Platforms may derive positive revenues from consumer
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exposure to both products. Each product exposure is costly to consumers: it requires time and
attention. The platforms’ revenues per consumer exposure to product 1 (1) could be referral
fees paid by an independent seller or the margin made on the sale of product 1 multiplied by
the conversion rate (probability that a consumer who sees the product ends up buying it) if
the platform supplies product 1 itself; or any type of fees directly tied to usage of product 1
(e.g. pay-per-view). Meanwhile, the platforms’ revenues per consumer exposure to product 2
(2) can be interpreted as "per-impression" or "per-click" fees paid by its seller. In section 4,
we also explore the effect of allowing platforms to charge consumers fixed access fees.
The key decision made by the platform is the amount of search diversion to induce through
its service, which we identify with the probability that it exposes consumers to product 2 before
directing them to product 1. Indeed, although consumers always prefer being immediately
exposed to product 1, the platform may find that first diverting them to product 2 maximizes
total revenues. We use the term "search" because in a sense consumers are searching for product
1 and the platform chooses how efficient to make this search process. More search diversion
leads to higher total exposure costs incurred by consumers.
Our modelling set-up is best interpreted as a stylized representation of advertising-supported
media, such as the ones listed in the following table:1
Table 1
All of these platforms provide users with first-party content (cf. Hagiu and Spulber 2012),
such as organic search results, information, editorial stories or products sold in their own name.
All of them make positive revenues from user exposure to advertising or products users were
1CPM is the advertising industry term for cost per impression (literally, "cost per mille", i.e. a thousand
impressions), while CPC stands for "cost per click".
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not necesarily looking for (2  0). Some of them (search engines, content portals) make
no revenues from first-party content, while others (shopping portals, e-commerce sites) derive
positive revenues from exposing consumers to first-party content. For shopping portals, 1 is
equal to the click-through rate of listed products multiplied by the referral fees charged to the
third-party merchants who sell those products. For e-commerce sites, 1 is the conversion rate
multiplied by the booking fees charged to users (Fandango) or margins made on shoes sold
(Zappos).
The extent of search diversion varies across these platforms from minimal (small and unin-
trusive ads on Fandango.com, sponsored search results at the bottom of Google Shopping pages)
to moderate (sponsored search results at the top and right-hand side of Google’s search engine
pages) to very high (in addition to showing several large ads on every content page, Forbes.com
requires users to view a video ad prior to watching every piece of video content and oftentimes
to click through a full-page display ad before reaching the desired content page).
1.2 Related literature
Our paper builds upon the model of search diversion introduced by Hagiu and Jullien (2011).
That paper established that search diversion allows platforms to: (i) trade off higher total
consumer traffic for higher revenues per consumer visit; and (ii) influence independent product
sellers’ choices of strategic variables (e.g., pricing). It also showed that search diversion is a
strategic instrument that cannot be easily replaced by contractual extensions and that it can
be socially desirable because consumers do not internalize the benefits of their search activities
for product sellers. We extend Hagiu and Jullien (2011)’s analysis in two important and novel
directions: competition among platforms and endogenous product and consumer affiliation
(Hagiu and Jullien 2011 focus exclusively on a monopoly platform with exogenously given
product and consumer affiliation).
We contribute to the economics and strategy literature on two-sided platforms by introduc-
ing a key design decision (search diversion) that many platforms have to make, but has not been
formally studied. Indeed, most of the existing work on two-sided platforms focuses on pricing
strategies (Armstrong 2006, Parker and Van Alstyne 2005, Rochet and Tirole 2006, Weyl 2010)
5
and market outcomes (Caillaud and Jullien 2003, Hossain et al. 2011) in the presence of indi-
rect network effects. Our paper is aligned with an emerging body of work aiming to expand
the formal study of platforms to design decisions (e.g. Parker and Van Alstyne 2008, Boudreau
2010, Hagiu and Spulber 2012, Veiga and Weyl 2012).
At a broader level, several articles have pointed out that platforms have to make design
compromises between the interests of their two sides (e.g. Kaplan and Sawhney 2000, Evans
and Schmalensee 2007). To the best of our knowledge however, this issue has received limited
formal modelling treatment.
Finally, our research is also connected to the literature on advertising-supported platforms:
Anderson and Coate (2005), Casadesus-Masanell and Zhu (2010), Crampes et al. (2009),
Gabszewicz et al. (2006), Peitz and Valletti (2008). These papers study product positioning
and product quality choices by ad-sponsored platforms. In contrast, our focus is on the design
of platforms’ product exposure mechanism. A recent strand of this literature studies the effect
of consumers’ and advertisers’ "multihoming" behavior (i.e. their presence on multiple online
outlets) on firm profits. Athey Calvano and Gans (2012) show that the value of advertising
in one outlet depends on consumer multihoming and focus on tracking technologies, while
Athey and Gans (2010) study targeted advertising. In our competition sections, we analyze
the impact of consumer and advertiser multihoming on the endogenous rate of exposure to
advertising (search diversion in our model). Ambrus Calvano and Reisinger (2012) discuss
the nature of price competition when all agents can multi-home. We share with them the
conclusion that competition does not restore efficiency, but their paper focuses on the volume
of advertising, whereas we focus on the design of the exposure service. Broadly, targeting,
tracking and diversion can all be viewed as various instances of platform service design, thus
our work is complementary to this stream of literature.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 lays out the modeling set-up
and analyzes the monopoly platform case, with endogenous consumer and advertising affiliation.
Section 3 introduces competition between platforms and analyzes three scenarios: a) platforms
compete for the exclusive affiliation of consumers, whereas the advertiser multihomes; b) plat-
forms compete for the exclusive affiliation of the advertiser, whereas consumers multihome; c)
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platforms compete for the exclusive affiliation of both consumers and the advertiser. In section
4 we introduce the possibility for platforms to charge consumers access fees. Section 5 intro-
duces incomplete information regarding the advertiser’s payoff in the context of a monopoly
platform. Section 6 concludes.
2 Monopoly platform set-up
In this section we lay out the foundation for our analysis using a variant of the model in
Hagiu and Jullien (2011). We present the model here but postpone its discussion until after
proposition 1, where it will be more transparent. There is a monopoly platform which allows
a unit mass of consumers to access two products, 1 and 2. Product 1 is already available
through (or affiliated with) the platform, while product 2 must be attracted by the platform
(its affiliation is endogenous). To access either product, a consumer must first affiliate with
(i.e. visit) the platform and then be exposed to the product through a search process described
below. Consumers are interested in product 1 only, which can be interpreted as content, e.g.
editorial stories, videos, organic search results. They are not interested in product 2, which can
be interpreted as advertising.
2.1 Consumers
All consumers derive net expected utility 1 =  from being exposed to product 1 and 2 = 0
from being exposed to product 2, where 0    1 is exogenously given. These utilities should
be interpreted as encompassing the utility of just viewing the product plus the expected utility
of actually consuming it, net of the price paid (we do not model product pricing decisions).
Ex-ante, i.e. before affiliating with the platform, consumers only differ in their location ,
uniformly distributed on [0 1]. The monopoly platform is located at 0. When consumer 
affiliates with the platform, she incurs transportation costs , where   0.
Ex-post, i.e. after deciding whether or not to affiliate with the platform, consumers learn
their unitary cost of exposure (or cost of search) , which they incur whenever they are exposed
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to a product. When both products are affiliated with the platform, consumers can only view
them sequentially and therefore are subject to one or two product exposures. The search cost
 can be interpreted as the cost of consumer attention; it is distributed on [0 1] according
to a twice continuously differentiable cumulative distribution function  . From an ex-ante
perspective, a consumer located at any position  perceives the same ex-post distribution of
search costs  ().
Thus, consumers make two decisions: whether or not to visit the platform, and whether or
not to engage in product search if they decided to visit the platform.
2.2 The platform
For conciseness, we assume that the monopoly platform is vertically integrated into product 1.
The platform derives expected profits 1 ≥ 0 for each consumer exposure to product 1, where
1 is known by all players and exogenously fixed.
Product 2 is supplied by an independent seller (advertiser), who must be induced to affiliate.
The advertiser derives profit 2 for every consumer exposure to its product, which is also publicly
known (we study the case in which 2 is unobservable in section 5). In order to affiliate with
the platform and gain access to its consumers, the advertiser must pay the platform a per-
impression (per-click) fee . We assume the platform has all the bargaining power when setting
.
Throughout the paper, only the ratio 21 affects the level of search diversion. For this
reason, we normalize our model by setting
1 = 1 and 2 = .
Note that a platform with no revenue from first-party content (1 = 0) corresponds to  = +∞,
which can be accomodated by the analysis.
For now, we assume the platform does not charge any access fees to consumers. We study
the effect of allowing access fees in section 4.
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2.3 Search diversion
The platform has a design technology that allows it to choose a probability  ∈ [0 1] with which
it first exposes any given consumer to product 2 before showing her product 1. The probability
 represents the level of search diversion induced by the platform. Once a consumer has been
exposed to product 2, she knows that she will next be exposed for sure to product 1, but she
will then need to incur her search cost  again. The focus of our paper is on platforms’ choice
of . We assume that  can be costlessly set to any value between 0 and 1.
One can think of (1− ) as a measure of how efficient the design of the platform is for
consumers. Does the platform provide quick and clear access to the products or content that
consumers are searching for (low )? Or does it try to expose consumers to various forms of
unsolicited content before providing the service they came for in the first place (high )?
2.4 Timing
The timing of the game we consider in this section is as follows:
1. The platform commits to  publicly and credibly
2. The platform sets the fee  to be paid by the advertiser
3. The advertiser decides whether or not to affiliate with the platform
4. Consumers observe  and the advertiser’s affiliation decision and decide whether or not
to affiliate with the platform
5. Affiliated consumers learn their individual cost , then engage in product search.
Three aspects of this set-up deserve mention. First, separating the choices of  and  has
no effect on the solution of the monopoly game.
Second, the design parameter  is observed by consumers before deciding whether or not
to visit the platform (for instance, through reviews or word of mouth) and by the advertiser
before deciding to affiliate or not, and we assume it is not subject to ex-post opportunism, i.e.
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cannot be adjusted once affiliation decisions have been made. In fact, it is in the platform’s
best interest to credibly announce  upfront because  affects not only consumer utility, but
also expected payoffs for the advertiser that the platform is courting.2
Third, affiliation decisions by consumers typically involve longer time horizons than activity
(search) decisions. Moreover, affiliation is usually based on less information than activity,
as consumers learn about the platform gradually. This is captured by our assumption that
affiliation is based on the level of search diversion and expectation of search costs, while activity
(search) is based on the realized individual search cost. This assumption simplifies the analysis
without loss of substance: the key feature that we need is that total consumer demand is
decreasing in  (as is realistic).
2.5 The consumer search process and affiliation decision
In stage 4, consumers affiliated with the platform must decide whether to search or not. When
the platform has chosen   0 and product 2 is affiliated, consumers know that they may be
diverted. A consumer with search cost  ≤  who is first diverted to product 2 will still proceed
to product 1, because she knows with certainty that she will obtain net utility −  ≥ 0. If the
consumer is not diverted, i.e. if she is directly exposed to product 1, then she stops searching
immediately and will not be exposed to product 2 (which would yield negative net utility −).
To fix ideas, it is useful to think of an advertising-supported news website. If a user is first
shown an ad, she will still click or scroll to find the news content. If she is shown the content
right away, she will never go on searching for ads.
The consumer’s net expected utility from searching is thus − (1 + )  and is positive for
 ≤  (1 + ). Consumers with search cost above  (1 + ) do not engage in search at all.
Using the news website example, the expected utility provided by the site to such consumers
is not sufficient to justify the time wasted clicking through or scrolling over ads.
Working backwards to stage 4, a consumer located at  affiliates with the platform if and
2If ex-post opportunism was possible, then the unique equilibrium with consistent expectations would be
∗ = 1. Indeed, once consumers and the advertisers are affiliated, the platform can unambiguously increase
revenues by increasing . Thus, it is in the platform’s interest to credibly commit to (or develop a reputation
for) a level of search diversion ∗  1 ex-ante (∗ = 1 is almost never optimal).
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only if  ()−  ≥ 0, where:
 () ≡
Z (1+)
0
(− (1 + ) )  ()  (1)
is the expected consumer utility from the perspective of stage 4, gross of access price and
transportation costs. Note that  () is decreasing.
If only one product is affiliated with the platform then consumers who visit the platform
find the affiliated product with probability 1 in just one round of search. If only product 1
is affiliated then expected consumer utility from the perspective of stage 4 is  (0). If only
product 2 is affiliated then expected consumer utility is 0.
2.6 Optimal search diversion
Since the advertiser’s per impression profit  is common knowledge, the platform sets  = 
(slightly below) in stage 2, which ensures the advertiser affiliates and extracts its entire profit.3
The incentives to divert search are thus the same as if the platformwere also vertically integrated
with the product 2 seller, i.e. if it owned both products.
Total consumer demand for (or traffic to) the platform is then min ( ()  1), weakly
decreasing in the level of search diversion . The platform’s profits as a function of  are
 ( )min ( ()  1) , (2)
where we have denoted4
 ( ) ≡ (1 + )
µ 
1 + 
¶
the revenues derived by the platform from the product exposures of each affiliated consumer.
The optimization of (2) over  involves a trade-off between total consumer traffic and par-
ticipation in the search process on the one hand, and the average number of product exposures
3Note that the platform always (weakly) prefers to attract the advertiser. Indeed, the platform can always
replicate the scenario with no advertiser affilation by choosing  = 0.
4The argument  is included for consistency with the competition section, where the price per exposure
charged to the advertiser can be lower than .
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per consumer on the other hand. Indeed, an increase in  induces a consumer to see two prod-
ucts with probability , which yields revenues 1 +  to the platform, but it also reduces the
proportion of consumers who engage in search,  ( (1 + )), as well as total consumer traffic
to the platform,  () . Variations of this tradeoff are analyzed at length in Hagiu and Jullien
(2011). The key novelty here is the term  () : indeed, Hagiu and Jullien (2011) treat total
consumer affiliation with the platform as exogenously given, equal to 1.
We also denote:
 () ≡ argmax { ( ) ()} (3)
 () ≡ argmax { ( )} ,
so that  ()   () because  () is decreasing. With this notation, we obtain:
Proposition 1 The optimal level of search diversion for a monopoly platform is:
 ( ) = argmax { ( )min ( ()  1)} (4)
=
⎧
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
 () if  ≤  ( ())
 −1 () if  ∈ [ ( ())   ( ())]
 () if  ≥  ( ())
It is (weakly) increasing in  and (weakly) decreasing in .
The second part of the proposition (proven in the appendix) states that the platform di-
verts search more when it derives higher revenues from the product that consumers are not
interested in (advertising) relative to the product that they are interested in (content). The
reason is straightforward: when the platform derives more revenues from content (advertis-
ing), its interests are more (less) aligned with those of consumers, therefore the optimal level
of search diversion is lower (higher). Recall indeed that consumers always prefer less search
diversion. The comparative static in  is easily understood: the platform diverts search more
when consumer traffic is less elastic in (i.e. less responsive to) search diversion.
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This result is consistent with the examples discussed in the introduction. Restricting atten-
tion to platforms that do not charge access fees, those platforms that derive no revenues from
content, i.e. with  = +∞ (e.g. search engines, Forbes.com), clearly engage in more search
diversion relative to platforms with content revenue, i.e. with  finite (e.g. Google Shopping,
Fandango). Note in particular the contrast between Google search, on which sponsored search
results are at the top and on the right hand side of the page, and Google Shopping, where
sponsored search results only appear at the bottom of the page (much less intrusive).
Thus, although highly stylized, our model contains the two ingredients necessary to capture
the key tradeoffs associated with search diversion. First, platforms’ profit incentives are im-
perfectly aligned with consumer preferences: platforms derive positive revenues from exposing
consumers to products that they do not care about (  0 and possibly   1). Second,
exposure to individual products is costly for consumers and the platform can make design deci-
sions (captured by ) that influence the degree to which consumers are exposed to one product
relative to the other.
Of course, in most real-world settings there are more than two products, multiple sellers
or advertisers per product and perhaps even complementarity or substitutability across prod-
ucts. Introducing any of these aspects would unnecessarily complicate our analysis, since the
fundamental mechanics of search diversion remain unchanged. For the same reason, we treat
 as exogenously given in our model, i.e. we do not endogenize price-setting by independent
sellers. Some of these extensions are treated by Hagiu and Jullien (2011) in the context of a
monopoly platform choosing search diversion. Finally, while the assumption 2 = 0 best fits
contexts in which product 2 is advertising (as in the examples listed in Table 1 above), the
general implications we derive hold for any platforms that have incentives to divert consumers
away from the products that best suit their preferences and towards products they are less -
but still positively - interested in (2  0). For instance, Netflix uses its recommender system
in an attempt to steer users towards less popular movies, which entail lower licensing costs
and are less likely to run out of stock, which in turn means they generate higher margins for
Netflix (Shih et al. 2007). Similarly for Amazon.com. Indeed, the difference between diverting
consumers to advertising and diverting them to products that they find less desirable is simply
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one of degree. Consumers may derive 0 expected utility from being exposed to advertisements,
whereas they might perceive a (small) positive expected utility from being exposed to products
other than the ones that they initially came to the platform for. The only thing that matters
is that the platform derives positive margins from such unsollicited products. In a previous
draft version, we worked with 2  0: the analysis turned out to be more complex than the one
presented here but the main results were the same. This is why we have opted to work with
2 = 0.
3 Competition
In this section we analyse how competition affects search diversion incentives. We maintain the
same structure of consumer preferences, except that there are now two competing platforms, A
and B, one at each end of the Hotelling [0 1] segment. Each platform is vertically integrated
into product 1. Although we use the same label, product 1 on platform  may differ from the
product 1 on platform B. We consider three competition scenarios:
i) Competition for consumers: the advertiser can multihome and the platforms compete
solely for the exclusive affiliation of consumers
ii) Competition for advertising: consumers can multihome (at no charge) and the platforms
compete for the exclusive affiliation of a unique advertiser
iii) Two-sided competition: the platforms compete for the exclusive affiliation of both con-
sumers and the independent advertiser.
In all three scenarios, the timing is the same as in the monopoly case. Platforms A and
B commit simultaneously to  and  respectively in stage 1 (publicly and credibly), then
simultaneously set fees  and  to be paid by the advertiser in stage 2. The other stages
are similar, with agents (advertiser and consumers) choosing to affiliate exclusively or not,
depending on the competition scenario. When a consumer is affiliated with both platforms, her
stage 5 utility from engaging in product search on one platform is independent of what she does
on the other platform.
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We have separated the choices of  and  between the first two stages of the game in order
to better reflect reality: fees charged to sellers are typically set after committing to platform
design. Our equilibrium characterization below would be the same if we worked with the entire
space of ( ) deviations. The difference is that the set of equilibrium conditions to satisfy
would be significantly more complicated: this is another reason for adopting our simpler set-up.
3.1 Competition for consumers
In this scenario, the advertiser multi-homes whereas consumers single-home. In stage 2, each
platform sets  =  and the advertiser affiliates with both platforms.5
If  is not too large so that the two platforms actually compete against each other, then
platform ’s profits from the perspective of stage 1 are:
Π =  ( )
µ
1
2
+
 ()−  ()
2
¶
(5)
In this case, the equilibrium level of search diversion solves:
 2 ( ) = argmax
½
 ( )
µ
1
2
+
 ()−  ( 2 ( ))
2
¶¾
(6)
In contrast, if  is large, then each platform acts as a local monopolist and chooses the
monopoly level of search diversion. Relegating the remaining details to the appendix, we
obtain:
Lemma 1 There exists    ( ()) such that the symmetric equilibrium level of search
diversion when platforms compete for consumers only is:
 ( ) =
⎧
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
 2 ( ) if 0 ≤  ≤ 
 −1 ¡ 
2
¢
if  ≤  ≤ 2 ( ())
 () if  ≥ 2 ( ())
5This scenario is equivalent to assuming that each platform is vertically integrated into products 1 and 2.
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It is increasing in  for  ∈
h
0 
i
, decreasing in  for  ∈
h
 2 ( ())
i
, and everywhere
(weakly) increasing in .
On the interval  ∈
h
0 
i
, i.e. when platforms compete,  has the opposite effect on
 relative to  . To explain this, recall that the level of search diversion results from a
trade-of between revenue per user (1 + ) and total participation by consumers. The latter
becomes less elastic when competition for consumers is less intense (larger ), which shifts the
tradeoff towards extracting more revenues per user, i.e. towards more diversion. On the other
hand, if  is above the  threshold, then platforms no longer compete against each other,
therefore  is decreasing in , just like  . The comparative statics in  is the same as for
the monopoly platform and the same interpretation applies.
We can now compare  with  :
Proposition 2 Relative to the level of search diversion chosen by a monopoly platform, the
equilibrium level of search diversion when platforms compete for consumers only is strictly
lower for low , strictly higher for intermediate , and equal for large . Specifically:
•  ( )   ( ) for 0 ≤    ( ())
•  ( )   ( ) for  ( ())    2 ( ())
•  ( ) =  ( ) for  ≥ 2 ( ())
Restricting attention to the region of interest  ∈
h
0 
i
(on which platforms actually
compete), our model predicts that the equilibrium level of search diversion with competing
platforms is lower than the one chosen by a monopolist when competition is intense (low )
and higher when competition is not too intense (high ). Figure 1 represents  and  as
functions of .
To see why competing platforms may end up diverting search more than a monopolist,
consider the equilibrium elasticity of consumers’ affiliation with respect to search diversion.
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Figure 1:
This elasticity is − 0 ()  () in the case of a monopoly that does not cover the entire
consumer market (i.e.    ()), whereas it is equal to − 0 ()  for a duopoly with equal
market shares. Thus, if    () then the former elasticity is larger, which leads to less search
diversion under monopoly. On the other hand, the opposite holds if the monopolist covers the
entire consumer market (   ( ())): the monopolist’s choice of search diversion ignores
the impact on consumer affiliation decisions, which competing platforms can never ignore.
3.2 Competition for unsolicited content
Consider now the opposite scenario relative to the previous subsection: consumers can costlessly
multihome and the platforms compete for the exclusive affiliation of an advertiser. Specifically,
we assume that the platforms offer non-substitutable versions of product 1 (content), so that
a consumer who affiliates with both intermediaries derives utility 2 from consuming the two
versions of product 1 (gross of search and transportation costs). We assume the advertiser affil-
iates exclusively with one platform.6 This scenario occurs in mature markets, where consumers
have long-standing and stable affiliation decisions, but platforms must attract new advertisers.
If the advertiser affiliates with platformA, then platformA profits are ( )min ( ()  1),
6Exclusive affiliation by the advertiser could be obtained endogenously by assuming that, for each consumer,
only the first product exposure matters and that there is a sufficiently large probability that the same consumers
are exposed to advertising on both platforms (see Athey Calvano and Gans 2012).
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whereas platform B profits are  ()min ( (0)  1). The advertiser’s payoff is
( − ) 
µ 
1 + 
¶
min
µ ()
  1
¶
= ( ( )− ( ))min
µ ()
  1
¶
.
Relegating the remaining details to the appendix, we obtain:
Proposition 3 When consumers multihome and platforms compete for the exclusive affiliation
of an advertiser, the equilibrium level of search diversion is the same as that chosen by a
monopoly platform:  ( ) =  ( ).
Thus, competition for product 2 (advertising) does not affect search diversion relative to a
monopolist. This result is driven by Bertrand competition for the advertiser. Each platform
 sets its search diversion level  to maximize its joint profits with the advertiser when the
latter affiliates with  exclusively, i.e.  ( )min ( ()  1). Then both platforms compete
in fees  so that the advertiser ends up capturing all of the joint profits in excess of each
platform’s outside option,  ()min ( (0)  1), which does not depend on search diversion
levels. Consequently, although competition shifts the repartition of the joint vertical profit in
favor of the advertiser, it is still optimal for platforms to choose the design that maximizes
this joint profit. The difference is that a monopoly platform maximizes the value that can be
extracted from the advertiser, whereas competing platforms seek to maximize the chance to
attract the advertiser.
3.3 Competition for both consumers and advertising
Let us now turn to the case in which the two platforms compete for exclusive affiliation on both
sides of the market. The expressions of platforms’ profits and of the advertiser’s payoff when
the latter affiliates exclusively with platform  are:
Π =  ( )
µ
1
2
+
 ()−  (0)
2
¶
and Π =  ()
µ
1
2
+
 (0)−  ()
2
¶
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Π () = ( ( )− ( ))
µ
1
2
+
 ()−  (0)
2
¶
The key difference with the previous scenarios is that here it is no longer clear whether
both platforms wish to compete for the advertiser. This is because the "losing" platform B
obtains higher consumer demand, which may compensate for its lower revenues per consumer
(no advertising). Thus, given the levels of search diversion set in stage 1, it is possible that
B obtains a larger profit without the advertiser than the maximum profit it could expect to
achieve if it were to attract the advertiser. When this is the case, platform B prefers not to make
an offer to the advertiser in stage 2 and platform A is a de facto monopoly on the advertiser
side of the market. Consequently, according to the same logic as before, platform A’s optimal
choice of search diversion maximizes its joint profits with the advertiser. Let then:
  ( ) ≡ arg max∈[01]
½
 ( )
µ
1
2
+
 ()−  (0)
2
¶¾
(7)
be the level of search diversion that maximizes the joint profit of the advertiser and the platform
it affiliates with, when facing a platform that offers product 1 (content) only.
Of course, the alternative scenario is that the two platforms actually compete to attract the
advertiser. For this case, we define
 ( ) ≡ arg max∈[01]
½
 ( )
µ
1
2
+
 ()−  (0)
2
¶
+  ()
µ
1
2
+
 (0)−  ()
2
¶¾
(8)
as the level of search diversion that maximizes total industry profit, i.e. the joint profits of the
advertiser and both platforms. Since  () is decreasing, we have:
  ( )   ( )
Whether or not the two platforms effectively compete for the advertiser depends on  ( ) ∈
[0 1], which solves:
 ¡  ( )  ¢
Ã
1
2
+
 ¡  ( )¢−  (0)
2
!
=  ()
Ã
1
2
+
 (0)−  ¡ ( )¢
2
!
,
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with the convention  ( ) ≡ +∞ if:
 ¡  ( )  ¢
Ã
1
2
+
 ¡  ( )¢−  (0)
2
!
  ()
µ
1
2
+
 (0)−  (1)
2
¶
When  ∈ [0 1], it represents the level of search diversion that platform A (who obtains the
advertiser) would have to choose in order to render platform B indifferent between extracting
maximum joint profits with the advertiser and ceding the advertiser to platform A. If  = +∞
then platform B always prefers competing for the advertiser (no matter the level of search
diversion chosen by A). Furthermore, if  ∈ [0 1] then, by choosing   , platform A can
secure the affiliation of the advertiser (i.e. platform B prefers not to compete for it).
Focusing on the range of  such that the two platforms are actually competing7 and relegating
the proof to the appendix, we obtain:
Lemma 2 There exists    (0) such that, for all  ∈
h
0 
i
, the maximum level of search
diversion that can be sustained in equilibrium is:
 ( ) =
⎧
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
  ( ) if  ( ) ≤   ( )
 ( ) if   ( ) ≤  ( ) ≤  ( )
 ( ) if  ( ) ≥  ( )
The maximum level of search diversion  ( ) is continuous in its 2 arguments, (weakly)
increasing in  for  ∈
h
0 
i
and (weakly) increasing in .
Note that the equilibrium is not unique when  ( ) ≥   ( ) (in that case, there is a
continuum of equilibria), which is why we have chosen to focus on the equilibrium that involves
the highest level of search diversion. Fundamentally, equilibrium multiplicity stems from the
fact that search diversion has opposite effects on the two sides of the market. It arises when
the platform that wins the advertiser is in a situation where raising  would strongly depress
7Once again, if  is large enough, then the two platforms behave as local monopolists. Platform A then
chooses  =  =  for this range of .
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consumer demand, whereas reducing  would lead the advertiser to jump ship to the other
platform.
According to the most basic intuition, the equilibrium level of search diversion ought to
maximize joint profits of the "winning" platform and the advertiser, i.e.  =   ( ).
Perhaps surprisingly, this is not always the case here. It is important to understand how the
other two outcomes may arise.
First, when  ≥  , the equilibrium level of search diversion  maximizes joint profits of
the advertiser, the winning platform (say, A) and the losing platform (B). The fact that platform
B’s profit is taken into account (note that it depends on the search diversion level chosen by
A) might seem odd at first glance. The interpretation is as follows: A must offer the advertiser
a payoff just above the largest payoff that can be offered by B, who in turn can only offer the
advertiser the difference between joint profits and B’s outside option, i.e. what B gets when
the advertiser affiliates with A. This term is increasing in the search diversion level chosen by
A: a higher  increases B’s outside option (more consumers go to B instead of A) and thereby
decreases the hurdle that A needs to overcome in order to attract the advertiser. In other words,
when it expects platform B to compete for the advertiser, the winning platform A maximizes
total industry profit because it internalizes the fact that yielding more consumer demand to
platform B (through more search diversion) reduces the cost of attracting the advertiser, by
reducing platform B’s willingness to compete.
On the contrary, when  ≤   , the winning platform can, with the same level of search
diversion, obtain maximum joint profits and secure the affiliation of the advertiser without
having to give up additional consumer demand. The equilibrium is then the same as if one
platform were vertically integrated with product 2.
The intermediate range   ≤  ≤  arises because the total industry profit is maximized
at a higher level of search diversion ( ) than the vertically integrated profit ( ). In this range,
when neither  nor   are sustainable, the winning platform is cornered in an equilibrium
where the losing platform is just indifferent between competing and not competing for the
advertiser (as discussed above).
Finally, the comparative statics in ( ) are the same as in the case of competition for
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consumers and interpreted in the same way. Comparing with the level of search diversion
chosen by a monopolist, we obtain (the proof is in the appendix):
Proposition 4 Relative to the level of search diversion chosen by a monopoly platform, the
maximum equilibrium level of search diversion when platforms compete for both consumers and
the advertiser is strictly lower for low  and strictly higher for large . Specifically, there exists
 ∈ [0  (0)] such that:
•  ( ) ≤  ( ) for 0 ≤  ≤ 
•  ( )   ( ) for    ≤ 
This result confirms the one obtained under competition for consumers only (despite a
significantly more complex analysis): once again, the equilibrium level of search diversion with
competing platforms is lower than the one chosen by a monopolist when competition is intense
(low ) and higher when competition is not too intense (high ). The explanation is the same.
4 Access fees
In this section we introduce the possibility that platforms can charge access fees to consumers,
denoted by  and paid before search costs  are observed. A priori,  can be positive or negative.
A negative access fee can be interpreted as a monetary subsidy (e.g. cash or redeemable points)
or first-party content (beyond product 1) that consumers value at more than the price being
charged.
The timing we use throughout this section (monopoly as well as competing platforms) is:
1. Platforms choose  and  simultaneously
2. Platforms choose  and  simultaneously
3. The advertiser decides which platform(s) to affiliate with
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4. Platforms choose consumer access fees  and  simultaneously
5. Consumers decide which platform(s) to affiliate with
6. Affiliated consumers learn  and engage in product search.
Our timing ensures that decisions regarding consumer access fees do not interfere with
decisions affecting the quality of the services offered to consumers (search diversion). The value
expected by consumers from each platform results from the combination of search diversion and
the advertiser’s affiliation decisions, and it is known at the time price competition for consumers
occurs.8 As in the previous sections, we have separated the choices of  and  between the first
two stages of the game.
4.1 Monopoly
The monopoly platform’s profits are now:
max
½
( + ( ))min
µ ()− 
  1
¶¾
. (9)
It is straightforward to obtain (details are in the appendix):
Proposition 5 The optimal level of search diversion for a monopoly platform that can charge
access fees is:
b () = + () ≡ argmax { ( ) +  ()} (10)
Allowing the monopoly platform to charge access fees results in less search diversion (b ≤ )
if and only if the profit-maximizing access fee is non-negative (d ≥ 0)
The first part of the proposition says that when the platform can monetize consumer par-
ticipation, it chooses search diversion to maximize the joint surplus (platform + consumers)
8This allows us to avoid coordination issues in affiliation decisions (see Caillaud and Jullien 2003), which are
not the focus of this paper.
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from participation. Also, note that just like  (), the level of search diversion with access
fees b () is weakly increasing in .
The second part of the proposition says that the ability to monetize consumer participation
reduces search diversion incentives. This result is intuitive: if the platform wishes to charge
consumers a positive access fee, it must increase their willingness-to-pay, which means it needs
to reduce search diversion. Conversely, a platform wishes to subsidize consumers when this sac-
rifice allows it to mitigate the effect of increasing search diversion on consumers’ participation.
This result is consistent with some of the examples discussed in the introduction. Compare
the websites of Forbes and The New York Times. Both rely on advertising, but The New
York Times charges users a subscription fee, whereas access to Forbes is entirely free for users.
Advertising on the New York Times web page is moderate; in contrast, advertising is highly
intrusive on Forbes.com.
4.2 Competition
Consider the first competition scenario, in which the advertiser multihomes and consumers
singlehome. In stage 2 the platforms set  =  = , thus fully extracting the advertiser’s
surplus. As a result, stage 4 profits for platform  are:
Π = ( + ( ))
µ
1
2
+
 ()−  −  () + 
2
¶
Given ( ) chosen in stage 1, the stage 2 pricing equilibrium is easily verified to be  =
+ ( ()−  ()− ( )− 2 ( )) 3, leading to stage 1 platform profits:
Π ( ) = 
2
µ
1 +
 () + ( )−  ()− ( )
3
¶2
(11)
Going backwards to stage 1, the symmetric equilibrium level of search diversion is:
b () = argmax { ( ) +  ()} = b () . (12)
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In other words, we obtain the same level of search diversion as the one chosen by a monopoly
platform. The following proposition (proven in the appendix) confirms that this is also true
under the other two competition scenarios (their analysis is more complicated):
Proposition 6 When platforms can charge access fees, the equilibrium levels of search diver-
sion under all three competition scenarios are the same and equal to the level chosen by a
platform monopolist:
b () = b () = b () = + () = b ()
Furthermore, in the two competition scenarios in which one side multihomes, the equilibrium
level of search diversion with access fees is lower relative to the case with no access fees if and
only if the equilibrium access fee is positive.
Thus, when access fees are feasible, the equilibrium level of search diversion is identical to
the one chosen by a monopoly platform. In this case, platforms maximize the joint surplus of
the relationship with consumers and use the access fee to share this surplus with consumers.
Competition only affects the level of the access fee.
In all three competition cases, the central part of the proof is showing that in the equilib-
rium of the game starting at stage 2 the advertiser affiliates with the platform  that creates
the highest joint surplus  ( )+ (). This was straightforward for the scenario with com-
petition for consumers only, but turns out to be more complicated for the other two scenarios
(cf. appendix).
The fundamental reason we obtain the equilibrium level of search diversion that maximizes
 ( ) +  () for all monopoly and competition cases is that the access fee allows platforms
to transfer surplus so all that matters beyond stage 1 of the game is the total surplus per
consumer. This is clear in the scenario when the advertiser multihomes, because each platform
extracts the entire profit from the vertical structure (platform plus advertiser) and this profit
is increasing in the total surplus per consumer. The two scenarios with advertiser singlehoming
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are more complex because competition for the advertiser reduces the profit that platforms can
extract per consumer. Still, we show that the total profit that can be promised by each platform
to the advertiser remains increasing in the total surplus per consumer. Thus, in equilibrium,
competition for the advertiser still leads the platform winning the advertiser to maximize the
total surplus per consumer. Indeed, the platform generating the highest total surplus is able
to offer better terms to the advertiser, holding constant the profit on the consumer side. This
logic applies both when consumers multihome and when they singlehome.
For the second part of the proposition, the result and intepretation is the same as in the
monopoly case above. If platforms charge positive access fees to consumers, they must offer
them more value, i.e. less diversion. Conversely, if platforms subsidize the participation of
consumers, they need to make up for the loss by increasing advertising revenues, which they
can achieve by increasing diversion.
5 Incomplete information and vertical integration (monopoly)
Another interesting extension of our baseline model is to introduce incomplete information
regarding the advertiser’s profit  (up to now, we have assumed all players observe ). Ac-
cordingly, in this section we revert to the monopoly platform scenario and we assume that 
is unobservable to the platform. In particular, we assume that  is drawn from a cummula-
tive distribution function  (), which is common knowledge. The timing is exactly as in the
previous section: we cover the possibility that the platform may charge an access fee  .9
9Here, allowing the platform to choose  after the advertiser’s affiliation decision creates a form of ex-post
opportunism by the platform. Once the advertiser decides to affiliate in stage 3, the platform sets  too high
from a joint perspective in stage 4, because it does not fully internalize the advertiser’s profits. This hold-up
issue arises more generally in two-sided settings whenever one side makes participation decisions before the
other and the platform cannot commit to the price it will charge to the second side ex-ante. The implications
of commitment in such settings are analyzed in depth in Hagiu and Spulber (2012). The timing we have chosen
to work with is arguably the most realistic: the advertiser’s participation determines to a large extent the
platform’s business model (in the sense of Casadesus-Masanell and Zhu 2010). It seems unrealistic for the
platform to commit to a specific consumer access fee before knowing whether it will derive advertising revenues.
Furthermore, none of our generalizable results below would change if we allowed the platform to commit to 
prior to the advertiser’s affiliation decision. In fact, results would be identical if we allowed the platform to
commit to two different  ’s, contingent on whether the advertiser affiliates or not.
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The advertiser affiliates with the platform in stage 3 if and only if  ≥ . When the platform
does not charge any access fees, its expected profits from the perspective of stage 1 are:
max
½
(1− ()) · ( )min
µ ()
  1
¶
+ () ·  ()min
µ (0)
  1
¶¾
(13)
When the platform cam charge access fees, its stage 1 expected profits are:
max
⎧
⎨
⎩
(1− ())max
n
( + ( ))min
³ ()−
  1
´o
+ ()max
n
( +  ())min
³ (0)−
  1
´o
⎫
⎬
⎭ (14)
In both cases, with probability  () the platform only has product 1 to offer, hence there is no
search diversion and the platform’s revenues come from consumer exposure to product 1 and
access fees. With probability (1− ()) the independent advertiser affiliates and the platform
derives higher revenues, which come from consumer exposures to both products and access fees.
For the sake of concision, we omit the first-order conditions of (13) and (14) with respect
to the advertiser fee . In both cases, the optimal fee (and brespectively) is set such that
the marginal net gain from a small reduction in  (higher probability of advertiser affiliation
multiplied by the revenue differential) is equal to the marginal net loss (lower advertising
revenues whenever the advertiser affiliates). We focus directly on the optimal levels of search
diversion,  and b respectively, which are given by:
 = argmax
½
 ¡ ¢minµ ()  1
¶¾
=  ¡  ¢
b = argmax © ¡ b¢+  ()ª = b ¡b¢
Thus, in both cases, the optimal level of search diversion under incomplete information is
equal to the monopoly level under exogenous affiliation and complete information (expression
(4) without access fees and (10) with access fees), when profit per exposure to advertising is
equal to the profit of the marginal advertiser, i.e.  = or  = brespectively. Of course, the
marginal advertisers are different in the two cases, but the general principle is the same.
It is interesting to compare this outcome to the corresponding benchmark with exogenous
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affiliation (or vertical integration) under incomplete information. Specifically, assume product
2 is exogenously affiliated with the platform (stages 2 and 3 are eliminated), but we maintain
the incomplete information setting by assuming the platform does not know  prior to setting
 and  (when access fees are feasible). Alternatively, one could assume that, when access fees
are feasible, the platform observes  prior to setting  : the analysis that follows would then
produce very similar results.
When access fees are not feasible, the platform’s expected profits in stage 1 are:
max
½Z

 ( )min
µ ()
  1
¶
 ()
¾
= max
½
 ( )min
µ ()
  1
¶¾
,
where  ≡ R  () is the expected value of  and the equality above follows from the
linearity of  ( ) in .
When access fees are feasible, the platform’s expected profits in stage 1 are:
max
½Z

( + ( ))min
µ ()− 
  1
¶
 ()
¾
= max
½
( + ( ))min
µ ()− 
  1
¶¾
The optimal level of search diversion is therefore  ( ) without access fees and b ()
with access fees (recall expressions (4) and (10) above). In other words, the optimal level
of search diversion in the benchmark exogenous affiliation case is determined by the average
advertiser , both with and without access fees.
Combining the previous results, we have:
Proposition 7 With incomplete information about the advertiser’s payoff, the platform’s op-
timal level of search diversion is determined by the marginal advertiser who affiliates (cor-
responding to  = or  = b). Endogenous advertiser affiliation results in more search
diversion relative to the exogenous affiliation benchmark if and only if the marginal advertiser
under endogenous affiliation derives higher profits per consumer exposure relative to the average
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advertiser, i.e. if and only if    (respectively, b  ) without (respectively, with)
access fees.
This result is reminiscent of Spence (1975)’s insight that a monopolist’s incentives to invest in
product quality are driven by the marginal customer. In our model, things are more complicated
because there are two sides (or two customer groups): consumers and the advertiser. Since
consumers all have the same marginal disutility from search diversion, the relevant "customer"
for determining search diversion (the inverse of "quality") is the advertiser.
An important implication of this result is that endogenous product affiliation and incomplete
information create a novel potential source of search diversion incentives, relative to the two
basic sources of incentives identified in Hagiu and Jullien (2011). Specifically, endogenous
affiliation of the advertiser leads to more search diversion relative to exogenous affiliation if and
only if the marginal advertiser derives higher profits relative to the average advertiser. This is
because consumers are not interested in advertising, therefore higher advertising revenues make
the platform’s profit incentives run counter to consumer preferences.
If we endogenized the affiliation of product 1 (content) instead of that of product 2 (ad-
vertising), we would obtain a very similar result, except that the inequalities in Proposition
7 would be reversed. In other words, endogenous affiliation of product 1 would lead to more
search diversion if and only if the marginal seller of product 1 derived lower profits per consumer
exposure than the average seller of product 1.
6 Conclusion
Our study of search diversion by competing platforms has yielded several important and novel
insights (relative to Hagiu and Jullien 2011). First and most importantly, the effect of com-
petition between platforms on the equilibrium level of search diversion is determined by the
nature of competition. When horizontal differentiation between competing platforms in the
eyes of consumers is reduced, the equilibrium level of search diversion decreases (i.e. search
quality increases), as expected. On the other hand, we have shown that entry of a competitor
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may lead to more or at least as much search diversion as under monopoly. Specifically, when
consumers singlehome, entry of a competitor leads to more (less) search diversion relative to
monopoly when the degree of horizontal differentiation is intermediate (low). When the degree
of horizontal differentiation is large, "competing" platforms behave as local monopolies and
therefore divert search to the exact same extent as a monopolist would. An important result is
that effective competition for exclusive affiliation on both sides of the market sometimes leads
to a level of search diversion that maximizes total industry profit.
Second, allowing platforms to charge unrestricted access fees to consumers leads to the
striking result that competing platforms choose the exact same level of search diversion as a
monopoly platform, irrespective of the nature of competition and of the degree of horizontal
differentiation. Furthermore, under monopoly and competition with at least one multihoming
side, platforms that charge positive access fees to consumers have weaker incentives to divert
search relative to platforms that cannot (or choose not to) charge such fees. On the other hand,
platforms that subsidize consumer participation have stronger incentives to divert search.
Third and finally, we have shown that endogenous affiliation of both sides (consumers and
advertisers or content sellers) combined with incomplete information regarding the advertis-
ers’ (or content sellers’) payoff per consumer can create an additional reason to divert search.
Specifically, a monopoly platform’s incentives to divert consumer search are stronger relative
to the exogenous affiliation (or vertical integration) benchmark if the marginal independent
advertiser (respectively, content seller) derives higher (respectively, lower) profits per consumer
exposure than the average advertiser (respectively, content seller). This result suggests that
the extent of vertical integration should be an important predictor of the magnitude of search
diversion.
A broader implication of our analysis is that design decisions by two-sided platforms (search
diversion being but one specific example) must balance the potentially conflicting interests of the
two sides of the market. One should then not be surprised that the entry of a competitor may
lead to design decisions which go against consumers’ preferences, but instead favor third-party
sellers, advertisers, or whatever the relevant second side might be. A recent example was the
privacy compromise made by Microsoft with the design of its Internet Explorer 8 web browser
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in favor of advertisers and against users’ interests. The episode was reported by the Wall
Street Journal: "As the leading maker of Web browsers, the gateway software to the Internet,
Microsoft must balance conflicting interests: helping people surf the Web with its browser to
keep their mouse clicks private, and helping advertisers who want to see those clicks. In the
end, the product planners lost a key part of the debate. The winners: executives who argued
that giving automatic privacy to consumers would make it tougher for Microsoft to profit from
selling online ads. Microsoft built its browser so that users must deliberately turn on privacy
settings every time they start up the software." (Wingfield (2010))
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7 Appendix
In order to reduce clutter, throughout the appendix we will drop the () arguments of the various
levels of , unless they are needed for clarity.
7.1 Proof of Proposition 1
If  ∈ [ ()   ( )] then  ( ) =  −1 (), decreasing in  and constant in .
If  ≤  () then  ( ) = argmax { ( )}, so the F.O.C. determining  can be
written:

µ 
1 + 
¶
−
µ
1
 + 
¶ 
(1 + )2
0
µ 
1 + 
¶
= 0
The left-hand side is increasing in , which implies (assuming second-order conditions are satisfied)
that  ( ) is increasing in . It is obviously constant in .
If  ≥  ( ) then  ( ) = argmax { ( ) ()}, so the F.O.C. determining  is:µ
1
 + 
¶
·
∙
−
(1 + )2
0
µ 
1 + 
¶
 () + 
µ 
1 + 
¶
 0 ()
¸
+ 
µ 
1 + 
¶
 () = 0
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Since  0 ()  0, the left-hand side is increasing in , which implies (assuming second-order conditions
are satisfied) that  ( ) is increasing in  and constant in .
7.2 Proof of Lemma 1
Given  , platform ’s profits are:
Π () =
⎧
⎨
⎩
 ( )
h
1
2
+
 ()− ()
2
i
if  () +  () ≥ 
 ( )  () if  () +  () ≤ 
There are therefore 3 possible equilibria:
1)  =  2, where  2 solves equation (6), so that  2 is determined by the following
F.O.C.:
 ( ) 0 () +  ( ) = 0 (15)
From this, it is easily seen that  2 is increasing in . It is also increasing in  by a very simi-
lar argument to that employed in the proof of proposition 1. This is an equilibrium if and only if
 ( 2) ≥ 2 (the consumer in the middle of the Hotelling segment obtains non-negative utility),
i.e. only if  ≤ , where  is uniquely defined by:

³
 2
³
 
´´
= 2
Furthermore, comparing (15) with (3) we have:
 2 (  ( )) =  , (16)
so that  ( 2 (  ( )))   ( ) 2, which implies    ( ).
2)  =  . This is an equilibrium if and only if  ( ) ≤ 2, i.e. if and only if
 ≥ 2 ( ). Let us show that 2 ( )  . The first-order conditions that determine
 2
³
 
´
and  () are, respectively:
 ( ) 0 () + 2 () ( ) = 0 for  2
³
 
´
 ( ) 0 () +  () ( ) = 0 for  ()
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Comparing the two, it is clear that  2
³
 
´
  (), which implies:
 = 2
³
 2
³
 
´´
 2 ( )
3)  =  −1 (2). Suppose 2 =  −1 (2). If 1 ≥  −1 (2) then platform 1’s profits are
 (1 ) (1) . Thus, for 1 =  −1 (2) to be a best response to 2 =  −1 (2), it must be
that  ≤  −1 (2), i.e. if  ≤ 2 ( ).
If 1 ≤  −1 (2) then platform 1’s profits are:
 (1 )
µ
1
2
+
 (1)− 2
2
¶
The maximizer ∗ of this profit expression is defined by the first-order condition:
 (∗ ) 0 (∗) + (2 +  (∗)) (∗ ) = 0
Thus, for 1 =  −1 (2) to be a best response to 2 =  −1 (2), it must be that ∗ ≥  −1 (2),
i.e.  (∗) ≤ 2, which implies:
 (∗ ) 0 (∗) + 2 (∗) (∗ ) ≤ 0
Comparing this with the first-order condition determining  2
³
 
´
,
 ( ) 0 () + 2 () ( ) = 0,
we have ∗ ≤  2
³
 
´
, which is equivalent to  (∗) ≥ 
³
 2
³
 
´´
= 2.
Consequently, we must have  ≥ .
Thus,  =  −1 (2) is an equilibrium if and only if  ∈
h
 2 ( )
i
. Note that
 −1 (2) is decreasing in .
7.3 Proof of Proposition 2
On the interval  ∈
h
0 
i
, we know from proposition 1 and lemma 1 that  is decreasing in ,
whereas  =  2 is increasing in . Furthermore, from (16), we have  2 =  =  at
 =  ( ). We can conclude that    for    ( ) and    for  ( )   
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.
7.4 Proof of Proposition 3
Consider stage 3. The advertiser’s payoff from affiliating exclusively with platform  is:
( − ) 
µ 
1 + 
¶
min
µ ()
  1
¶
= ( ( )− ( ))min
µ ()
  1
¶
,
while platform ’s payoff is  ( )min ( ()  1). In stage 2, platform  is prepared to lower
its fee  until its payoff is equal to its outside option,  ()min ( (0)  1). Consequently, in the
equilibrium of the game starting at stage 2, the advertiser affiliates with the platform that has the
highest  ( )min ( ()  1). The fees in the stage 2 equilibrium are determined by:
( ( )− ( ))min
µ ()
  1
¶
=  ( )min
µ ()
  1
¶
−  ()min
µ (0)
  1
¶
for the "winning" platform  and:
 ( )min
µ ()
  1
¶
=  ()
µ (0)
  1
¶
for the "losing" platform .
Consider now stage 1. If  ( )min ( ()  1)   ( )min ( ()  1) then platform
 attracts the advertiser with probability 1 and obtains profits
 ()min
µ (0)
  1
¶
+ ( )min
µ ()
  1
¶
− ( )min
µ ()
  1
¶
.
This is an equilibrium if and only if  = argmax { ( )min ( ()  1)}. If ( )min ( ()  1) =
 ( )min ( ()  1) then the advertiser is indifferent between affiliating with either platform
and both platforms’ profits are equal to  ()min ( (0)  1). This is an equilibrium if and only if
 =  = argmax { ( )min ( ()  1)}. Thus, we have proven that the equilibrium level of
search diversion in all cases is argmax { ( )min ( ()  1)} =  ( ).
7.5 Proof of Lemma 2
We assume that  ( )
³
1
2
+  ()− (0)
2
´
is quasi-concave and its maximizer   is interior to [0 1].
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For any , denote then by  () ∈ [0 1] the solution to
 ( )
µ
1
2
+
 ()−  (0)
2
¶
=  ()
µ
1
2
+
 (0)−  ()
2
¶
with the convention  () = +∞ for all  such that:
 ( )
µ
1
2
+
 ()−  (0)
2
¶
  ()
µ
1
2
+
 (0)−  (1)
2
¶
Since  () is decreasing, the function  () is inverted U-shaped in , with maximal value
  ≡ max  () = 
¡ ¢ .
We restrict attention to levels of search diversion ( ) such that:
 ( )
µ
1
2
+
 ()−  (0)
2
¶
≥  () 1
2
for  = 
Fix ( ) chosen in the first stage of the game. Denote by Π () the payoffs obtained by the
advertiser when it affiliates exclusively with platform  and by Π the profits derived by platform ,
where  ∈ {}. If the advertiser affiliates exclusively with platform  ∈ {} in the equilibrium
of the game beginning in the second stage then the equilibrium fees ( ) chosen in stage 2 must
be such that (assuming interior demand10) the following conditions hold:
Π () = max©Π ()  0ª (17)
Π () =  ( )
µ
1
2
+
 ()−  (0)
2
¶
−  ()
µ
1
2
+
 (0)−  ()
2
¶
Π =  ( )
µ
1
2
+
 ()−  (0)
2
¶
−Π ()
Π ≥  ()
µ
1
2
+
 (0)−  ()
2
¶
if Π () ≥ 0
Π ≥  () 1
2
if Π ()  0
The first condition ensures that the advertiser weakly prefers to affiliate with platform  and that
platform  cannot increase its profits by raising . The second condition requires platform  to offer
the advertiser all the surplus in excess of ’s outside option that would be created if the advertiser were
10Choosing  that induces zero demand for platform  ∈ {} is weakly dominated by a small ,
so we rule it out.
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to affiliate with  instead of . If  was offering any less in equilibrium, it could then profitably deviate
by slightly decreasing  and getting the advertiser to affiliate with it (because of the first condition).
The third condition is a simple accounting equality. The fourth and fifth conditions ensure that plaform
 prefers the equilibrium to a deviation in which it would let the advertiser affiliate with platform 
or no platform at all (depending on whether platform  offers the advertiser a positive payoff).
With the notation above, we have Π () ≥ 0 if and only if  ≤  ().
Furthermore, if Π () ≥ 0 then the conditions above imply:
 ( )
µ
1
2
+
 ()−  (0)
2
¶
+  ()
µ
1
2
+
 (0)−  ()
2
¶
≥  ( )
µ
1
2
+
 ()−  (0)
2
¶
+  ()
µ
1
2
+
 (0)−  ()
2
¶
Suppose that the equilibrium (∗ ∗) is such that the advertiser affiliates with platform A. There
are three possibilities:
Case I: ∗   (∗)
In this case, we must have:
Π =  (∗ )
∙
1
2
+
 (∗)−  (0)
2
¸
− (∗ )
∙
1
2
+
 (∗)−  (0)
2
¸
+  ()
∙
1
2
+
 (0)−  (∗)
2
¸
≥  ()
∙
1
2
+
 (0)−  (∗)
2
¸

Local optimality of ∗ implies that we must have ∗ =  . For this to be an equilibrium, we first
must be able to find ∗ such that  (∗) ≥  , which is possible if and only if   ≥  .
Second, neither A nor B can be able to profitably deviate. Consider any deviation  by platform
A. For the deviation to be profitable, A must continue to win the advertiser, otherwise it would obtain
 ()
µ
1
2
+
 (0)− (∗)
2
¶
, which is (weakly) dominated by the pre-deviation profits. Since ∗ =  ,
we also know that there is no profitable deviation  ≤  (∗), so the only possibility would be
 ≥  (∗), in which case platform A’s deviation profits would be:
Π =  ( )
µ
1
2
+
 ()−  (0)
2
¶
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But       (∗), so the expression above is decreasing for  ≥  (∗). Thus, there is no
profitable deviation for A.
Consider now a deviation  by platform B. The only way it can be profitable is if B wins the ad-
vertiser and makes profits larger than  ()
µ
1
2
+
 (0)− ( )
2
¶
. This requires    ¡ ¢ (otherwise
either A wins the advertiser or B wins it but its resulting profits are still  ()
µ
1
2
+
 (0)− ( )
2
¶
),
which yields deviation profits (recall conditions (17)):
 ( )
µ
1
2
+
 ()−  (0)
2
¶
But    ¡ ¢ is equivalent to:
 ()
µ
1
2
+
 (0)−  ()
2
¶
  ¡  ¢
Ã
1
2
+
 ¡ ¢−  (0)
2
!
and we have:
 ( )
µ
1
2
+
 ()−  (0)
2
¶
+  ()
µ
1
2
+
 (0)−  ()
2
¶
≤  ¡  ¢
Ã
1
2
+
 ¡ ¢−  (0)
2
!
+  ()
Ã
1
2
+
 (0)−  ¡ ¢
2
!
Combining the last two inequalities, we obtain:
 ( )
µ
1
2
+
 ()−  (0)
2
¶
  ()
Ã
1
2
+
 (0)−  ¡ ¢
2
!
,
which means B’s deviation is not profitable.
We have thus proven that if     then there exists an equilibrium (∗ ∗) with ∗ = 
and ∗ =   .
Case II: ∗   (∗)
In this case, we must have:
Π =  (∗ )
µ
1
2
+
 (∗)−  (0)
2
¶
≥  () 1
2
Local optimality of ∗ implies that we must have ∗ =   . For this to be an equilibrium, we first
must be able to find ∗ such that  (∗)    , which is always possible since  (0) = 0.
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Second, neither A nor B can be able to profitably deviate. Any deviation  by platform A such
that  ≥  (∗) cannot be profitable, so we must have  ≤  (∗). If the advertiser affiliates with
platform A after such a deviation then A’s deviation profits are:
 ( )
µ
1
2
+
 ()−  (0)
2
¶
− (∗ )
µ
1
2
+
 (∗)−  (0)
2
¶
+  ()
µ
1
2
+
 (0)−  ()
2
¶
But  (∗)      , so these profits are increasing in  for  ≤  (∗), which means this
deviation is not profitable. The remaining possibility is that  ≤  (∗) and the advertiser affiliates
with platform B, which platform A can always induce by setting  = 0. In this case, A’s deviation
profits are  ()
µ
1
2
+
 (0)− (∗)
2
¶
. This deviation is not profitable if:
 ¡   ¢
Ã
1
2
+
 ¡ ¢−  (0)
2
!
≥  ()
µ
1
2
+
 (0)−  (∗)
2
¶
,
i.e. if ∗ ≤   . Note that it is always possible to find ∗ that satisfies both this condition and
 (∗)    above: for example, ∗ = 0 works.
Consider now a deviation  by platform B: it can be profitable only if it leads to the advertiser
affliating with B. In such a deviation, platform B’s profit would be:
 ( )
µ
1
2
+
 ()−  (0)
2
¶
−max
(
0 ¡   ¢
Ã
1
2
+
 ¡ ¢−  (0)
2
!
−  ()
µ
1
2
+
 (0)−  ()
2
¶)
(18)
Suppose that   ≥   , i.e.
 ¡   ¢
Ã
1
2
+
 ¡ ¢−  (0)
2
!
≤  ()
Ã
1
2
+
 (0)−  ¡ ¢
2
!
Then platform B’s best deviation is  =   , which yields profits:
 ¡   ¢
Ã
1
2
+
 ¡ ¢−  (0)
2
!
,
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less than the pre-deviation profits  ()
µ
1
2
+
 (0)− ( )
2
¶
. Thus, B has no profitable deviation.
Now suppose that      . There are two possibilities:
• If   ≥  then B’s best deviation (from (18)) is achieved for  =  , yielding profits:
 ¡  ¢
Ã
1
2
+
 ¡ ¢−  (0)
2
!
+  ()
Ã
1
2
+
 (0)−  ¡ ¢
2
!
− ¡   ¢
Ã
1
2
+
 ¡ ¢−  (0)
2
!
  ()
Ã
1
2
+
 (0)−  ¡ ¢
2
!
• If        then B’s best deviation (from (18)) is achieved for  =   , yielding profits:
 ¡   ¢
Ã
1
2
+
 ¡ ¢−  (0)
2
!
But        implies that:
 ¡   ¢
Ã
1
2
+
 ¡ ¢−  (0)
2
!
+  ()
Ã
1
2
+
 (0)−  ¡ ¢
2
!
  ¡   ¢
Ã
1
2
+
 ¡ ¢−  (0)
2
!
+  ()
Ã
1
2
+
 (0)−  ¡ ¢
2
!
,
which is equivalent to (recall the definition of  ):
 ¡   ¢
Ã
1
2
+
 ¡ ¢−  (0)
2
!
  ()
Ã
1
2
+
 (0)−  ¡ ¢
2
!
Thus, in both cases B has a profitable deviation so
¡∗ =    ∗¢ cannot be an equilibrium for
any ∗.
We have thus proven that there exists an equilibrium
¡∗ =    ∗ = 0¢ if and only if   ≥   .
Case III: ∗ =  (∗)
In this case, we must have:
Π =  (∗ )
µ
1
2
+
 (∗)−  (0)
2
¶
≥  ()
µ
1
2
+
 (0)−  (∗)
2
¶
,
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i.e. ∗ ≤  (∗) (this ensures A does not want to deviate by ceding the advertiser to B). Furthermore,
any deviation    (∗) such that the advertiser stays with A cannot profitable, so we must have
∗ =  (∗) ≥   . Similarly, any deviation  by platform A such that the advertiser stays with A
and    (∗) cannot be profitable, so we must also have ∗ =  (∗) ≤  .
Platform ’s profit is
 ()
µ
1
2
+
 (0)−  ( (∗))
2
¶
=  (∗ )
µ
1
2
+
 (∗)−  (0)
2
¶
.
For B to profitably deviate, it must obtain the advertiser. In such a deviation (), platform B’s profit
would be:
 ( )
µ
1
2
+
 ()−  (0)
2
¶
−max
½
0  (∗ )
µ
1
2
+
 (∗)−  (0)
2
¶
−  ()
µ
1
2
+
 (0)−  ()
2
¶¾
There are three possibilities:
a) If  (∗)    then B’s optimal deviation is  =   , which yields
¡   ¢µ12 +  ( )− (0)2 ¶.
This deviation is strictly profitable unless ∗ =   , which means ∗ =   .
b) If  (∗)   then B’s optimal deviation is  =  , which yields:
 ¡  ¢
Ã
1
2
+
 ¡ ¢−  (0)
2
!
− (∗ )
µ
1
2
+
 (∗)−  (0)
2
¶
+  ()
Ã
1
2
+
 (0)−  ¡ ¢
2
!
≥  ()
µ
1
2
+
 (0)−  (∗)
2
¶
This deviation is strictly profitable unless ∗ =  , which is possible only if   ≥  .
c) The remaining case is   ≤  (∗) ≤  . Here, B’s optimal deviation is  =  (∗),
which yields  ( (∗)  )
µ
1
2
+
 ((∗))− (0)
2
¶
. For this deviation not to be profitable we must
have  ( (∗)) ≤ ∗.
Using the analysis of the 3 cases above, we can infer the following:
• In all cases, the equilibrium level of search diversion ∗ verifies   ≤ ∗ ≤ 
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• If     then the maximum level of search diversion that can be supported in equilibrium
is ∗ =  (case I).
• If      then the only possible equilibrium level of search diversion is ∗ =   (case II).
• If   ≤   ≤  then the case I equilibrium cannot be sustained since  (∗) ≤   ≤  for
all ∗. Consequently, the maximum level of search diversion that could potentially be sustained
in equilibrium is ∗ =   (case 3). Let us make sure that this equilibrium does indeed work.
Let ∗ =   so that ∗ =  (∗) =   . To ensure that A has no profitable deviation, we
must show that   ≤  (∗) = 
¡ ¢. Recalling the definition of  and   ≤   ≤  ,
we have:
 ¡   ¢
Ã
1
2
+
 ¡ ¢−  (0)
2
!
+  ()
Ã
1
2
+
 (0)−  ¡ ¢
2
!
≤  ¡   ¢
Ã
1
2
+
 ¡ ¢−  (0)
2
!
+  ()
Ã
1
2
+
 (0)−  ¡ ¢
2
!
By the definition of   we also have:
 ¡   ¢
Ã
1
2
+
 ¡ ¢−  (0)
2
!
=  ()
Ã
1
2
+
 (0)−  ¡ ¢
2
!
We can then derive:
 ()
Ã
1
2
+
 (0)−  ¡ ¢
2
!
≤  ¡   ¢
Ã
1
2
+
 ¡ ¢−  (0)
2
!
,
i.e.   ≤ 
¡ ¢, as desired. Finally,   ≤   ≤  also implies  ¡ ¢ ≤   ≤  (recall
 () is weakly decreasing for  ≥  ). To ensure that B does not have a profitable deviation
we must then verify that  ¡ ¡ ¢¢ ≤   , which follows directly from   ≤  ¡ ¢. We
can then conclude that the maximum level of search diversion that can be sustained is indeed
∗ =   .
This concludes the proof of the first part of the proposition.
Let us now turn to the second part.  ( ) is continuous because   ( ),  ( ) and
 ( ) are continuous in both of their arguments. The fact that   and  are increasing in  is
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seen from the respective first-order conditions that determine them:
 ¡   ¢ ¡+  ¡ ¢−  (0)¢+ ¡   ¢ 0 ¡ ¢ = 0
 ¡  ¢ ¡+  ¡ ¢−  (0)¢+ ¡ ¡  ¢−  ()¢ 0 ¡ ¢ = 0
Both  ¡   ¢ and  ¡  ¢ are positive, so both left-hand sides above are increasing in .
The proof that   and  are increasing in  is very similar to the proof that  is increasing in
 (cf. proof of Proposition 1 above), therefore omitted.
Let us now turn to  ( ). From the definition of   we have:
 ¡   ¢
Ã
1
2
+
 ¡ ¢−  (0)
2
!
≥  (0 ) 1
2
=  () 1
2
,
which implies  ¡   ¢   (). We can then write the equation determining  ( ) as:
 (0)−  ¡¢ =  ¡   ¢ ¡+  ¡ ¢−  (0)¢ () − 
= max
½ ( ) (+  ()−  (0))
 () − 
¾
≡ ( ) ,
where the last equality follows from the definition of   . Using the envelope theorem, we have:
 ( ) = 
¡   ¢
 () − 1  0
 ( ) =  
µ 
1 +  
¶ +  ¡ ¢−  (0)
 ()  0
Since  (0) −  ¡¢ is increasing in  , we can therefore conclude that  ( ) is increasing in 
and increasing in , just like   and  .
Note that  ( ) is always equal to the middle value among   ,  and  ( ). As a result,
 ( ) inherits the same properties: increasing in  and decreasing in .
Furthermore, note that  ( ) is a well-defined equilibrium only if  is such that:
 ¡¢+  (0)  ,
i.e. such that the marginal consumer on the Hotelling segment derives positive net utility when the
platform that attracts the advertiser chooses  in equilibrium. Since  is increasing in , the above
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inequality holds for all  ∈
h
0 
i
, where    (0).
7.6 Proof of Proposition 4
From lemma 2,  is continuous and increasing in  for  ∈
h
0 
i
. We also know that  is
continuous and decreasing in  for all  ≥ 0. Furthermore, lim→0  = 0   = lim→0  ,
whereas if  ∈
³
 (0)  
´
then  =       , which implies   . Consequently,
there exists  ∈ [0  (0)] such that  ≤  for  ∈ £0 ¤ and    for  ∈ ³  ´.
7.7 Proof of Proposition 5
Denote by
³d  b´ the solutions to the optimization program:
max
½
( + ( ))min
µ ()− 
  1
¶¾
There are only two possibilities:
• if  ¡b¢−d ≥  then it must be thatd =  ¡b¢−  and profits are equal to  ¡b¢+
 ¡b  ¢− , which means we must have b = +
• if  ¡b¢ −d   then it must be that d = ¡ ¡b¢− ¡b  ¢¢ 2 and profits are
equal to
¡ ¡b¢+ ¡b  ¢¢2 4, so that we must have b = +
Thus, b = + in all cases. The first-order condition determining + can then be written:
−
(1 + )2
0
µ 
1 + 
¶
+ 
µ 
1 + 
¶
+  0 ()  = 0
The left-hand side is increasing in , which implies (assuming the second-order condition is satisfied)
that + is increasing in .
The optimal access fee is:
d =
⎧
⎨
⎩
 (+ )−  if  ≤ ( (+ ) + (+  )) 2
( (+ )− (+  )) 2 if  ≥ ( (+ ) + (+  )) 2
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Now compare + and  by looking at the first-order conditions that determine them:
 (+  ) +  0 (+ ) = 0
 (  ) ( ) + (  ) 0 ( ) = 0
It is thus apparent that max {+   } ≤  and + ≤  if and only if  (+ ) ≥
 (+  ). Consider then the two possible cases:
• If  (+ ) ≥  (+  ) thend ≥ 0 for all  and + ≤  . Recalling the expression
of  ( ) from 4, this implies that b () ≤  ( ) for all 
• If  (+ )   (+  ) then d ≥ 0 if and only if  ≤  (+ ). But in this case
we also have   +   , i.e.  ()   (+ )   ( ), which implies that
 ( (+ )  ) = + = b (). Since  ( ) is decreasing in , we therefore conclude
that b () ≤  ( ) if and only if  ≤  (+ ).
Thus, we have shown that in all cases, b ≤  if and only ifd ≥ 0.
7.8 Proof of Proposition 6
7.8.1 Consumers singlehome and the advertiser multihomes
The determination of the equilibrium level of search diversion b () is in the main text. For the
second part of the proposition, the equilibrium access fee charged by the two platforms is  =
 − ¡b ()  ¢. The two first order conditions that determine b () and  () =  2
(focusing on the case in which platforms actually compete) are, respectively:
 0 ¡b ¢+  0 ¡b¢ = 0
 0 ¡ ¢+ ¡ ¢  0 ¡¢ = 0
Comparing, it is easily seen that b ≤  if and only if  ≥  ¡b ()  ¢, i.e. if and only if
 ≥ 0.
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7.8.2 Consumers multihome and the advertiser singlehomes
Suppose that in stage 3 the advertiser affiliates with platform  ∈ {}. Then, in stage 4, platform
’s profits are ( + ( ))min {( ()− )  1}, which it optimizes over  to obtain profits
equal to Π ( () + ( )), where:
Π () ≡
⎧
⎨
⎩
2
4 if  ≤ 2
 −  if  ≥ 2
Clearly, Π () is increasing. In turn, platform ’s stage 4 profits are Π ( (0) +  ()) ≡ Π0.
The advertiser’s payoff from affiliation with platform  is then:
Π = ( − ) 
µ 
1 + 
¶
min
µ () + ( )
2  1
¶
In Stage 2, platforms choose ( ) taking ( ) as given, which is equivalent to choosing
( ), where:
 ≡  () + ( ) and ≡  () + ( )
Indeed, recall that  ( ) is increasing in  so there is a one-to-one relationship betweeen  and
 for each  ∈ {}.
To simplify notation, we also denote:
 ≡  () + ( ) and ≡  () for  ∈ {}
which are fixed from the perspective of stage 2.
The advertiser’s payoff from affiliation with platform  is then:
( − )min
µ
2  1
¶
≡ Π ()
It is easily seen that Π () is single-peaked in  and increasing in . Let also:
b ( ) ≡ argmax {Π ( )} =
⎧
⎨
⎩

2
if 
4 ≤ 1
2 if 
4 ≥ 1
(19)
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We first prove the following lemma:
Lemma 3 In the stage 2 equilibrium, if the advertiser affiliates with platform  then  ≥.
Proof. If the advertiser affiliates with platform  in stage 3, then in the stage 2 equilibrium (choices
of  and ) we must have:
Π = max {Π ()} such that Π () ≥ Π

 (20)
Π = max {Π ()} s.t. Π () ≥ Π0 (21)
Denote by
¡∗  ∗ ¢ the resulting equilibrium choices.
Since Π () is increasing in , whereas Π () is single-peaked in  and zero for  =
, in equilibrium the constraint in the program (20) must be binding with the highest possible value
of , so that
Π (∗ ) = Π
There are two possibilities. First, if the constraint in program (21) is not binding in equilibrium then:
Π = max {Π ()} = max
½
( − )min
µ
2  1
¶¾
Combined with (20), this implies:
max
½
( − )min
µ
2  1
¶¾
≥ ( − ∗ )min
µ∗
2  1
¶
= max
½
( − )min
µ
2  1
¶¾
,
It is easily verified that this implies  ≥ .
Second, suppose instead the constraint in (21) is binding in equilibrium:
Π ¡∗ ¢ = Π0 ≤ Π (∗ ) ,
where the last inequality is required in equilibrium (otherwise platform  would prefer to not attract
the advertiser). Since Π () is increasing, this is equivalent to:
∗ =  (0) +  () ≤ ∗ (22)
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Furthermore, if the constraint in (21) binds then  = b () violates the constraint, i.e.
b ()   (0) +  () (23)
Once again, there are two possibilities:
• If b () ≥  (0) +  () then b ()  b () (24)
From (19), this is only possible if    (and   4)
• If b ()   (0) +  () then (22) and (20) imply
Π (∗ ) ≤ Π ( (0) +  () )
Π (∗ ) = Π
¡∗ ¢ = Π ( () +  (0) ) ,
which implies
Π ( (0) +  () ) ≥ Π ( () +  (0) ) ,
i.e.  ≥ .
Suppose that in equilibrium platform A wins the advertiser. Then  ≥  and platform A’s
profits can we rewritten:
Π = Π ( ) ≡ max {Π ()} (25)
s.t. ( − )min
µ
2  1
¶
≥ Π ()
where:
Π () ≡ max
½
( − )
2
¾
s.t. Π () ≥ Π0 (26)
Suppose there exists 0 such that 0 =  (0 )+ (0)   =  ( )+ (), which
implies 0  . Thus, if platform A deviates to 0 in stage 1 then it wins the advertiser in stage 2
with probability 1. Furthermore, since Π () remains unchanged, the optimization problem above
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immediately implies Π (0 )  Π ( ). Therefore 0 is a profitable deviation. Thus, it must
be that in the stage 1 equilibrium  = + ≡ argmax { ( ) +  ()}.
If  6= + then platform B makes profits Π0 with probability 1 and Π0 does not depend on
. If  =  = + then we may assume that  wins the advertiser with probability 1. Thus, in
all cases it is an equilibrium that platform  chooses  = + and wins the advertiser.
For the second part of the proposition corresponding to this scenario, simply note that b = b
(which we have just proven) and  =  (from proposition 3). And we have already proven thatb ≤  if and only if  ≥ 0 (proposition 5). We can therefore directly conclude that b ≤ 
if and only if  ≥ 0 (since  = ).
7.8.3 Both sides singlehome
Suppose that in stage 3 the advertiser affiliates with platform  ∈ {}. Then, in stage 4, platform
 and platform ’s profits are, respectively:
( + ( )) 1
2 (+  ()−  (0)−  + )
( +  ()) 1
2 (+  (0)−  ()−  + )
Calculating the Nash equilibrium in prices, we obtain that stage 4 equilibrium profits are, respectively:
Π = 1
2
µ
+  () + ( )−  (0)−  ()
3
¶2
Π = 1
2
µ
+  (0) +  ()−  ()− ( )
3
¶2
The advertiser’s payoff from affiliation with platform  is then:
Π = ( ( )− ( )) 12
µ
+  () + ( )−  (0)−  ()
3
¶
In Stage 2, platforms choose ( ) taking ( ) as given, which is equivalent to choosing
( ), where:
 ≡  ( ) +  ()
Indeed, recall that  ( ) is increasing in  so there is a one-to-one relationship betweeen  and
 for each  ∈ {}.
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Denote also:
 ≡  ( ) +  () for  ∈ {1 2}
0 ≡  (0) +  ()
which are fixed from the perspective of stage 2.
Suppose that platform  wins the advertiser. Then platform profits in stage 4 can be written:
Π = Π () ≡ 1
2
µ
+  −0
3
¶2
Π = Π () ≡ 1
2
µ
+ 0 − 
3
¶2
Meanwhile, the advertiser’s payoff from affiliation with platform  is:
Π () ≡ ( − ) 1
2
µ
+  −0
3
¶
First, we prove the following lemma:
Lemma 4 In the stage 3 equilibrium, if the advertiser affiliates with platform  then  ≥.
Proof. Suppose platform  wins the advertiser in the equilibrium of the stage 2 game and denote by¡∗  ∗ ¢ the equilibrium choices in stage 2. We must then have:
∗ = argmax {Π ()} s.t. Π () ≥ bΠ (Π (∗ )) (27)bΠ (Π (∗ )) ≡ max {Π ()} s.t. Π () ≥ Π (∗ ) (28)
Since Π () is increasing in , whereas Π () is concave in  and equals 0 at  =,
in equilibrium the constraint in (27) must be binding and Π () must be decreasing in  at
the point  = ∗ where it intersects bΠ (Π (∗ )). This is equivalent to:
 − 3+0 ≤ 2∗ (29)
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Suppose the constraint in (28) is not binding. Then in equilibrium:
∗ =  − 3+02bΠ (Π (∗ )) = 124 (3+ −0)2
so that:
1
24 (3+ −0)
2 ≥ ( − 
∗ )
2
µ
+ 
∗ −0
3
¶
=
1
24 (3+ −0)
2 ,
which directly implies  ≥ .
Suppose now the constraint in (28) is binding, which means:
∗ −0 =0 − ∗ (30)
Furthermore, this requires that the peak of Π () in  violates the constraint, i.e.:
 − 3+0
2
−0  0 − ∗
which can be rewritten:
  3+ 30 − 2∗ (31)
Taking the sum of inequalities (29) and (31) above, we obtain:
 +  6+ 20 (32)
We can then write the fact that the constraint in (27) is binding, Π (∗ ) = bΠ (Π (∗ )),
as:
( − ∗ )
2
µ
+ 
∗ −0
3
¶
=
¡ − ∗ ¢
2
µ
+ 
∗ −0
3
¶
,
which, after using (30) and re-arranging, is equivalent to:
 ¡ − − ∗ + ∗ ¢+ ∗ −03 ¡ + − ∗ − ∗ ¢ = 0
Using (30) again, this is equivalent to:
 ( −) + 
∗ −0
3
( + − 20 − 6) = 0
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But (32) implies  + − 20 − 6  0 and we must have ∗ −0 ≥ 0 (otherwise platform 
would prefer to not provide any advertising in stage 4). Thus, we conclude that  − ≥ 0.
Suppose platform A wins the advertiser in equilibrium. Then the lemma implies  ( ) +
 () ≥  ( ) +  () and platform A’s profit in stage 2 is Π ( ) = Π (∗), where
∗ solves:
∗ = argmax
(
1
2
µ
+  −0
3
¶2)
s.t.
( − )
2
µ
+  −0
3
¶
≥ bΠ ( ∗)
bΠ ( ∗) ≡ max
½
( − )
2
µ
+  −0
3
¶¾
s.t.
1
2
µ
+  −0
3
¶2
≥ 1
2
µ
+ 0 − 
∗
3
¶2
Suppose there exists 0 such that  (0 ) +  (0)   ( ) +  (), which implies
 (0 ) +  (0)   ( ) +  (). Thus, if platform A deviates to 0 in stage 1 then
the lemma above implies that platform A wins the advertiser in stage 2 with probability 1. Let
then Π (0 ) = Π (∗0 ), where ∗0 is defined similarly to ∗, except that  is replaced by
 0 ≡  (0 ) +  (0).
There are several possibilities. First suppose the constraint in the definition of bΠ ( ∗) is
not binding, i.e. bΠ ( ∗) = 124 (3+ −0)2 ,
which does not depend on ∗. Pick then any  such that 0     0 −. We have ∗0 ≥
∗ +   ∗. To see this, note that 12
¡+ −0
3
¢2
is increasing in  and:
( 0 − ∗ − )
2
µ
+ 
∗ + −0
3
¶
 ( − 
∗)
2
µ
+ 
∗ −0
3
¶
= bΠ ( ∗) = bΠ ( ∗ + )
where the last equality follows from the fact that 1
2
³
+ 0−∗
3
´2
is decreasing in ∗.
Second, suppose the constraint in the definition of bΠ ( ∗) is binding, which implies
∗ −0 =0 − ∗
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and
∗ = argmax
(
1
2
µ
+  −0
3
¶2)
(33)
s.t.
( − )
2
µ
+  −0
3
¶
≥ ( − 20 + 
∗)
2
µ
+ 0 − 
∗
3
¶
There are now two possibilities regarding ∗0 :
• If the constraint in the definition of bΠ ( ∗0 ) is also binding then we have:
∗0 = argmax
(
1
2
µ
+  −0
3
¶2)
(34)
s.t.
( 0 − )
2
µ
+  −0
3
¶
≥ ( − 20 + 
∗0 )
2
µ
+ 0 − 
∗0
3
¶
Comparing (33) and (34), the only difference is  0  , so ∗0  ∗.
• If the constraint in the definition of bΠ ( ∗0 ) is not binding then:
 − 3+0
2
−0 ≥0 − ∗0
and, since the constraint in the definition of bΠ ( ∗) is binding, we also have:
 − 3+0
2
−0  0 − ∗
The last two inequalities imply ∗0  ∗.
Thus, in all possible cases, we have ∗0  ∗, which means that 0 is a profitable deviation
for platform A: Π (0 )  Π (0 ). Therefore, it must be that in the stage 1 equilibrium
 = + ≡ argmax { ( ) +  ()}.
If  6= + then platform B makes profits 12
³
+ 0−∗
3
´2
with probability 1.
If 2 =  = + then:
• with probability 1/2 platform 1 wins the advertiser so platform B’s profits are still Π0
• with probability 1/2 platform B wins the advertiser so its profits are Π (+  + ) ≥ Π0
(the inequality is strict if the constraint in program 26 is not binding).
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Thus, in all cases it is an equilibrium for platform B to also choose  = + (this is the only
equilibrium if the constraint in program 26 is not binding).
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